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Dr. Pedro Noguera is a professor of education at the University of California, Berkeley. He is also past president of the Berkeley School Board. His in depth analysis of the causes of and assessment of succesful programs for reducing and preventing youth violence is published here by In Motion Magazine as a series of hyper-linked articles which can be downloaded in segments. All sections can be reached from the intro page, or readers can follow from one section to another.
Although several states are experimenting with alternatives to the traditional approaches used to deal with violent juvenile offenders, old methods of social control still tend to dominate most state and federal policies. Generally, this approach is characterized by (1) the deployment of special units within local police departments targeted at youth gangs, schools and areas where young people congregate and socialize; (2) the enactment of stiffer penalties for convicted juvenile felons and more rigid sentencing guidelines for judges; and (3) reliance on large correctional facilities for detention and punishment.
During the 1960s and 1970s, several attempts were made to shift the focus of juvenile justice away from its emphasis on punitive remedies. *11 In Massachusetts, for example, all of the large juvenile correctional facilities were shut down during the 1970s and replaced by smaller, community-based programs. *12 Although less ambitious, similar efforts have been undertaken in Utah, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Florida. *13 Despite evidence that these reforms were both more cost-efficient and effective, many of these initiatives were abandoned as the rate of violent juvenile crime began to soar in the 1980s. In response to charges by legislators and segments of the public that violent and delinquent youth were being coddled, most states -- and California in particular-- have returned to earlier practices in juvenile corrections, placing a renewed emphasis on punishment.
As a result of this change in policy, the number of incarcerated youth has increased dramatically. In California, the number of juveniles incarcerated by the state increased from 5,700 in June 1985 to 9,400 in 1994. *14 Sentences for juveniles convicted of violent crimes have also been lengthened. *15 Increases in the juvenile inmate population have been reported in other states as well, though none have matched the pace of California, where the increase in incarceration has outpaced the ability of the state to finance and construct new facilities. Consequently, many youth correction centers are overcrowded, poorly maintained, and generally regarded as unsafe.*16 California and other states have responded by planning for the construction of more facilities and by modernizing some of the older ones. Despite the cost of this strategy, and the disastrous effect that diverting financial resources toward prison construction and maintenance has had on other state-sponsored programs, there is no sign that policymakers are seriously considering alternatives to incarceration at this time. *17
Enough time has passed since the mid-1980s to evaluate the results of this shift toward a more stringent approach in the treatment of violent juvenile offenders, and already several reasons for reconsideration of the direction of current policy have emerged. First, there is no evidence that the significant increase in the number of youth arrested and incarcerated for violent crimes has had any effect on the regularity with which acts of violence are committed. Though some argue that without this increase, even more violent crimes would have been committed, *18 the fact that incidents of youth violence, including the most serious forms (i.e. homicide, rape, armed robbery and kidnapping), have not decreased, and that most projections indicate that further increases are likely in the future, *19 suggests that the current approach may not be working. Most experts agree that the number of hard-core violent youth is relatively small, approximately 6% according to most estimates, *20 however, identifying these individuals before they commit crimes is nearly impossible. And incarcerating violent juveniles for longer periods or treating them as adults does little to deter violence since there is no evidence that perpetrators logically think through the consequences of their actions prior to carrying them out. Furthermore, the sheer cost of implementing this strategy weakens and limits the ability of the state to pursue other options, that might be more effective in preventing youth violence.
The effectiveness of incarceration as a strategy for reducing violent crime is limited in other ways as well. There is evidence that for many youth, the experience of serving time in a large detention center may actually increase the likelihood that they will commit violent crimes again in the future. *21 Little emphasis is placed on rehabilitation while youth are in custody, or on re-entry programs when they return to their communities. According to the California Youth Authority's (CYA) conservative measures, 55 - 60% of juvenile convicts return to prison within two years after their release. *22 Moreover, even though the juvenile-corrections systems in California remains officially committed to the goal of rehabilitation, producing a change in the behavior of a significant number of inmates is unlikely because most of the detention centers are tough, violent places. Since 1981, the number of cases of battery without a weapon committed against incarcerated youth in facilities managed by the CYA has increased steadily. *23 Juvenile convicts, the vast majority of whom are incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, *24 are compelled to contend with this pervasive violence much of which is due to widespread gang activity. The fact that prison officials are unable to control violence within these facilities is a further indictment of this strategy.
Finally, despite the substantial public investment required to finance the current strategy, there is no evidence that public fears about violent juvenile crime have subsided. Opinion polls suggest that the public continues to be very concerned about the problem of violent juvenile crime. For example, a national poll commissioned by the American Federation of Teachers to ascertain the public's expectations regarding public schools found that fears about violence and the lack of safety surpassed concerns about educational issues. *25 These trends are mirrored in California, where fears of violent crime remains high despite unprecedented levels of spending on law enforcement, the enactment of the so-called three-strikes initiative, and plans to construct a number of new prisons. 
Although it might be argued that fear of crime may be greater than the problem itself, an exaggerated perception of the problem is likely to result in even more support for punitive measures for dealing with violent crime. Thus far, few politicians have been willing to challenge this perception with accurate information, even though the reality is that young people in general, and minority youth in particular, are at greatest risk of becoming the victims of youth violence. *26 In addition, although incidents of violent juvenile crime tend to occur most often in low-income urban areas, in many ways the initiatives undertaken to deter violent crime and ensure public safety have catered to the needs and fears of middle-class voters who reside in communities that are relatively safe, while the needs of the most vulnerable populations have received less attention. *27
